Illinois Appellate Court, First District

I believe that the Illinois Supreme Court redefined the word resident. The definition of the word resident is now all about your stated intentions, regardless of your actions. The latest interpretation will give rise to residency challenges by City of Chicago Employees who are required to be residents of the city. They now will be able to (At least in theory) move their families temporarily outside the city as long as they do not abandon their address and intend on returning. Sounds good to me…

Supremes trash the Appellate Court. courtesy of Zorn from the Trib. The alacrity and clarity of this decision really do renew my faith in this court’s willingness to do the right thing.
«. the meaty analysis section in plain text form, is below:
ANALYSIS
Before proceeding to the merits, we wish to emphasize that, until just a few days ago, the governing law on this question had been settled in this State for going on 150 years.
In Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867), this court was faced with a question remarkably similar to that which is before us today. Smith, a longtime resident of Illinois, had been appointed a circuit judge by the governor of Illinois, and a quo warranto action was brought to remove Smith from that office on the grounds that he had not been an Illinois resident «for at least five years next preceding *** his appointment,» as the Illinois Constitution then required
In support of their action, the objectors pointed to the fact that Smith had moved with his family to Tennessee for eight months during the relevant five-​year residency period.
In concluding that Smith’s eight-​month sojourn to Tennessee did not result in an abandonment of his established Illinois residency, this court explained that, once established, «residence is lost *** by a union of intention and acts» and that «the intention in many cases will be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.» Smith, 44 Ill. at 24.
This court then examined the «surrounding circumstances» and found that
(1) Smith frequently declared that his move to Tennessee was only an experiment;
(2) just two months after arriving in Tennessee, Smith expressed a desire to return to Illinois as soon as became feasible;
(3) Smith at no time expressed an unqualified intention to remain in Tennessee;
(4) Smith declined to vote in a Tennessee election because «he desired to do no act by which he would lose his citizenship in [Illinois]»;
(5) he refused to sell his Illinois law books prior to his move, saying that «he would probably return, and would then need them in his [Illinois] law practice»; and
(6) he «only rented his [Illinois] residence when he left.» Smith, 44 Ill. at 23 – 24.
This evidence, the court concluded, was insufficient to «establish a presumption of loss of residence.» Smith, 44 Ill. at 24 – 25.
Since Smith was decided, the principles established in it have been consistently and faithfully applied in the candidacy context by the appellate court of this State.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner, 355 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847 (2005) («‘[W]here a person leaves his residence and goes to another place, even if it be another [s]tate, with an intention to return to his former abode, or with only a conditional intention of acquiring a new residence, he does not lose his former residence so long as his intention remains conditional.’ «(quoting Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners, 370 Ill. 196, 201 (1938)); Walsh v. County Officer Electoral Board, 267 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (1994) (whether candidate abandoned old residence in favor of new residence presents a question of intent, which is measured both by the «surrounding circumstances» and the candidate’s declarations thereof); Dillavou v. County Officers Electoral Board, 260 Ill. App. 3d 127, 132 (1994) (whether candidate abandoned established residence is a question of intent, and «‘an absence for months or even –10– years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment’ «) (quoting Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195 (1888)).
Moreover, the principles established in Smith and uniformly followed since were the very principles relied upon by the hearing officer, the Board, and the circuit court below.
Thus, from April 1867 through January 24 of this year, the principles governing the question before us were settled. Things changed, however, when the appellate court below issued its decision and announced that it was no longer bound by any of the law cited above, including this court’s decision in Smith, but was instead free to craft its own original standard for determining a candidate’s residency. See No. 1−11−0033, slip op. at 6 – 8 (dismissing the foregoing authority in its entirety).
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